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NOTE
THE APPLICATION OF THE FAIR DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT TO
ARTICLE 7 OF THE NEW YORK RPAPL
JOSHUA P. FOSTER*
INTRODUCTION
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or the
"Act")1 was enacted in an attempt to curtail the abusive practices
of debt collectors. 2 The Act was enacted in 1977 as a supplement
to the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA).3 The FDCPA
proscribes any harassment, abuse, or oppression of a debtor 4 and
prohibits debt collectors from making any false representations
in the collection of debts.5 The FDCPA further requires that "a
debt collector shall.., send the [debtor] a written notice...
* J.D. Candidate, June 2000, St. John's University School of Law; BA., The
State University of New York at Stony Brook-
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
2 See id. § 1692(a) (1994) ("There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive,
deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors."); see also
Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that the
purpose of the FDCPA is "to protect consumers who have been victimized by
unscrupulous debt collectors"); Wiener v. Bloomfield, 901 F. Supp. 771, 774
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that the FDCPA was enacted to protect consumers from
misleading statements made by some debt collectors); Graziano v. Harrison, 763 F.
Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.N.J. 1991) (noting that the purpose of the FDCPA is to prevent
the abuse of consumers and to enable debt collectors to efficiently collect debts
through reasonable avenues), aff/d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 950 F.2d
107 (3d Cir. 1991).
3 See S. REP. No. 95-382, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695,
1696. The CCPA is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
5 See id. § 1692e. This section also disallows any type of contact or
communication between a debt collector and a debtor that may be harassing or
abusive. See id. For example, communication of the debt may not be made to third
parties and the debt collector may not use an alias and may only contact the debtor
during reasonable hours of the day. See id.
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[stating] that unless the [debtor], within thirty days after receipt
of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion
thereof, the [alleged] debt will be assumed to be valid."6 The
FDCPA also regulates communications between debt collectors
and debtors7 and includes detailed notice requirements.8
6 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)-(a)(3) (1994). The FDCPA defines a "debt collector" as:
[Any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the
mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any
debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly,
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.... [Tihe term
includes any creditors who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses
any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is
collecting or attempting to collect such debts.
Id. § 1692a(6); see also Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1995) (finding that
the term "debt collector" includes persons who collect debts as a business and
attorneys who are regularly involved in the collection of debts); Wegmans Food
Mkts. v. Scrimpsher (In re Scrimpsher), 17 B.R. 999, 1011 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982)
(requiring that the principal purpose of the business be the collection of debts);
Kizer v. Finance Am. Credit Corp., 454 F. Supp. 937, 939 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (noting
that an individual who collects debts owed to a third party is considered a "debt
collector," while an individual who collects debts for himself, under his own name, is
generally not considered a "debt collector").
7 For example, the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from communicating with
alleged debtors concerning the collection of a debt "at any unusual time or place." 15
U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) (1994). The debt collector may not contact a debtor "if the debt
collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer's employer prohibits the
consumer from receiving such communication." Id. § 1692c(a)(3). In addition, if the
debt collector knows an attorney represents the debtor, the collector may not
communicate with the debtor without the attorney's consent. See id. § 1692c(a)(2).
8 See id. § 1692g(a). This section provides in pertinent part:
Within five days alter the initial communication with a consumer in
connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the
following information is contained in the initial communication or the
consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice
containing-
(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days alter receipt
of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the
debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; [and]
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing
within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is
disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a
judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment
will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector ....
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
The New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
(RPAPL) only requires that a landlord give "at least three days'
notice in writing" prior to commencing summary proceedings to
evict a residential tenant.9 Application of the requirements of
the FDCPA to the circumstance that the RPAPL was intended to
govern would produce an unjust result. A careful analysis of the
legislative history of the FDCPA suggests that Congress did not
intend for the FDCPA to govern the actions of an attorney acting
on behalf of landlord who is attempting to evict a non-paying
tenant and to collect back rent in conjunction therewith. 10
The conflict between the FDCPA and RPAPL provisions was
analyzed in Romea v. Heiberger & Associates." In Romea, the
plaintiff was a tenant in a Manhattan apartment building,12 and
the landlord alleged that she had failed to pay rent for four
months. 13 Plaintiff was notified,14 in accordance with the
provisions of the RPAPL, that she would have to pay the back
rent or vacate her apartment within three days to avoid the
commencement of summary proceedings to recover possession of
The notice provided to the consumer must not be "false, deceptive, or
misleading" as to the validity or actual plans for collection of the debt. 15 U.S.C. §
1692(e) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). To determine whether the actual notice is in
violation of the above provisions, most courts use "an objective standard, measured
by how the 'least sophisticated consumer' would interpret the notice received from
the debt collector." Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted); see also Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993) (adopting
the "least sophisticated consumer" standard); Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953
F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir. 1992) (approving the use of the "least sophisticated
consumer" test by the district courts); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168,
1174-75 (11th Cir. 1985) (adopting the "least sophisticated consumer" standard).
9 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711(2) (McKinney 1979). The statute requires a
landlord to demand either that the rent be paid or provide at least three days' notice
to the tenant that the summary proceedings will be commenced if he does not either
vacate the premises or become current with his rent payments. See id.
10 See S. REP. No. 95-382, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695,
1697. A report of Senate discussions during the passage of the FDCPA cites major
studies which show that the majority of people who are in default on a debt are not
"deadbeats." See id. The studies further indicate that "the vast majority of
consumers who obtain credit fully intend to repay their debts." Id. (emphasis
added). This language is significant because the term "repay" connotes a previous
extension of credit. Rent is not a previous extension of credit, as it is generally paid
both prior to and during occupation of the property.
11 988 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
12 See Romea, 988 F. Supp. at 713.
13 See id.
14 The opinion refers to the defendant's predecessor in interest as having sent
the notice to the plaintiff. See id. It is unclear, however, whether the predecessor in
interest was the landlord, a law firm, or a collection agency.
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the premises and the back rent.15 The notice was not sent
directly from the landlord, but from a law firm retained by the
landlord.16 The plaintiff contended that the law firm was a "debt
collector" within the meaning of the FDCPA and that the notice
was a "communication" for the purpose of collecting a "debt."17
Accordingly, the plaintiff contended that she was protected by
the FDCPA.18  The plaintiff additionally maintained that
although the notification met the requirements of the RPAPL, it
violated the FDCPA by "omitt[ing] notice of the required thirty
day validation period."19
On appeal, the Second Circuit ruled that back rent in the
residential landlord-tenant relationship constitutes a "debt"
within the meaning of the FDCPA.20 Likening back rent to a
dishonored check and explaining that neither "derive[s] from an
extension of credit but rather because the payor breached its
payment obligations in the contract between the parties,"21 the
court held that because back rent is a "debt," and since the
RPAPL section 711(2) notice delivered information regarding
15 See id.
16 See id. (noting that the "[diefendant is a law firm that is said regularly to
attempt to collect debts owed to this and other landlords"). The FDCPA applies to
external debt collectors, such as the law firm in Romea, but does not apply to
private debt collectors who attempt to collect their own debts. See supra note 6.
17 See Romea, 988 F. Supp. at 713, 715.
18 See id. at 713.
19 Id. The court held that the defendant's argument that rent is not a "debt"
within the meaning of the FDCPA could not be "squared with the language or
history of the statute." Id. at 714.
20 See Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998).
21 Id. Many circuits have held that a dishonored check constitutes a "debt"
within the meaning of the FDCPA. See, e.g., Snow v. Jesse L. Riddle, P.C., 143 F.3d
1350, 1353 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that a dishonored check constitutes a debt
within the meaning of the FDCPA); Duffy v. Landberg, 133 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (8th
Cir. 1998) (stating that a dishonored check is a debt because it is a failure to fulfill
an obligation), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 821 (1998); Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys.,
Inc., 119 F.3d 922, 924 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting with approval the Seventh Circuit's
holding that a dishonored check is a "debt" within the meaning of the FDCPA, and
applying the rationale of that case); Bass v. Stolper, 111 F.3d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir.
1997) (concluding that the attempt to collect on a dishonored check is covered under
the FDCPA); see also O'Connor v. Check Rite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1010, 1013-14 (D.
Colo. 1997) (treating a dishonored check as a debt under the FDCPA).
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
such debt, the notice sent by the defendant qualified as a
"communication" under the FDCPA.22
Congress enacted the FDCPA to protect consumers from the
unconscionable practices of "debt collectors" and to give
consumers reasonable time to contest the validity of a "debt."23
The FDCPA was not intended to limit the ability of landlords to
remove a non-paying tenant.24 The RPAPL, however, explicitly
prescribes the means to remove a non-paying tenant from the
landlord's premises.25 The New York State legislature enacted
Article 7 of the RPAPL to dissuade landlords from exercising
"self-help," an often used practice resulting from the extremely
time-consuming common-law action in ejectment. 26  The
application of the FDCPA to landlord-tenant relationships would
drastically impede the purposes of the RPAPL.27
This Note contends that the notification requirement of the
RPAPL should not be subject to the provisions of the FDCPA, as
such notification does not deliver information regarding a "debt."
Part I explores the various judicial interpretations of the term
"debt." Part II examines the constitutional doctrines regarding
the Supremacy Clause and federal preemption of state statutes.
Part III discusses discrepancies between the intended scope and
purpose of the RPAPL and the FDCPA. While the FDCPA's
current definition of a "debt collector" embraces attorneys, Part
IV discusses the significance of the omission of attorneys from
the definition of "debt collector" in earlier versions of the Act.
Parts V and VI delineate New York's statutory scheme and
22 See Romea, 163 F.3d at 116. "[The § 711 letter that Heiberger sent to Romea
was undeniably a 'communication' as defined by the FDCPA in that it conveyed
'information regarding a debt' to another person." Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2)
(1994)).
23 See supra note 2.
24 See infra Part II.
25 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 2000); see
also Velazquez v. Thompson, 451 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that the main
purpose of the legislative summary eviction proceedings is to afford a landlord an
efficient, expedient, and inexpensive means to remove a non-paying tenant).
26 See Velazquez, 451 F.2d at 204 (reasoning that the New York State
Legislature enacted summary proceedings to avoid the delays associated with the
common law action in ejectment, which prompted landlords to resort to "self-help");
see also Reich v. Cochran, 94 N.E. 1080, 1081 (N.Y. 1911) (noting that the purpose
of New York's summary proceedings is to effectuate speedy recovery of a landlord's
premises). See generally Tri-State Refreshments, Inc. v. Nitke, 246 N.Y.S.2d 79
(Broome County Ct. 1964) (same).
27 See infra Part VI.
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describe methods that must be employed to obtain an exemption
from the FDCPA.
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "DEBT" UNDER THE FDCPA
There is a clear split in the circuits as to whether a "debt"
under the FDCPA requires an extension of credit or a deferral of
payment.28 The Third Circuit, in Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate
Group,29  interpreted the FDCPA as pertaining only to
contracted-for services in which credit had previously been
offered or extended.30 In Zimmerman, the plaintiffs received a
letter from a cable company accusing them of illegally receiving
"Home Box Office" video programming services31 and demanding
compensation for the alleged theft.32 The plaintiffs commenced
suit alleging violations of the FDCPA and maintained that the
defendant's demand for compensation was an attempt to collect a
"debt" within the meaning of the Act.33 The court rejected the
plaintiffs position and held that a "debt" must involve an "offer
or extension of credit to a consumer."34 Credit generally refers to
a loan of money, such as with a credit card. As such, the court
found that the alleged amount owed by the plaintiffs was not a
"debt" within the meaning of the FDCPA.35
28 A majority of circuits have held that a "debt" within the meaning of the
FDCPA does not require an extension of credit. See Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs.,
988 F. Supp. 712, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998). This
construction, however, is contrary to the use of the term "debt" throughout most of
the CCPA, which was amended to include the FDCPA. Another issue that arises is
whether the Electronic Fund Transfer Act pertains to "debt." See infra note 58.
29 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1987).
30 See id. at 1167-69.
31 See id. at 1165. The cable company conducted an investigation to identifr
individuals illegally receiving its programming services. See id.
32 See id. at 1166.
33 See id. at 1167.
34 Id. at 1168. The court looked to other subchapters of the CCPA and
concluded that the term "debt" is consistently used to refer to a transaction
"involving the offer or extension of credit to a consumer." Id. But see Bass v. Stolper,
111 F.3d 1322, 1325 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that the language of the FDCPA does
not require there be an "extension of credit"); Broadnax v. Greene Credit Serv., No.
95-3829, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 776, at *12 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1997) (per curiam)
(concluding that a bad check constitutes a debt embraced by the FDCPA).
35 See Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1167.
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The Seventh Circuit, in Bass v. Stolper,36 rejected the
holding in Zimmerman and held that a dishonored check did
constitute a "debt" and that an extension of credit is not required
for a transaction to be covered by the FDCPA.3 7 The court,
reviewing the plain meaning of the Act, noted that there is "no
language in the Act's definition of 'debt' (or any other section of
the Act) that mentions, let alone requires, that the debt arise
from an extension of credit."38 In Romea, the Second Circuit
interpreted the FDCPA in a similar manner and analogized back
rent to a dishonored check.39 The Romea court, however, did not
address whether the FDCPA requires an extension of credit.
36 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997). In Bass, the plaintiffs joint account holder
wrote a check to a supermarket that subsequently bounced. See id. at 1323. The
defendant is the law firm employed by the supermarket to collect the funds
originally due to them from the bounced check See id. The firm sent a letter to the
plaintiff stating that it would "hold off taking any action for 7 days if Bass ... would
make arrangements to pay." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The plaintiff filed
suit alleging that the defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the
FDCPA. See id. The district court found that "a dishonored check creates a 'debt'
under the FDCPA." Id. at 1324. The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's
ruling and found that there is no requirement in the FDCPA that a "debt" flow from
an extension of credit or a deferment ofpayment. See id. at 1326.
37 See id. The court utilized the general rule of statutory interpretation,
discussed in Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 700-01 (1995), that courts are
"prohibited from reading into clear statutory language a restriction that Congress
itself did not include." Bass, 111 F.3d at 1326. The court stated that clear statutory
terms must be given their ordinary meaning and that the ordinary meaning of the
term transaction has "a broad reference to many different types of business dealings
between parties, and does not connote any specific form of payment." Id. at 1325.
38 Bass, 111 F.3d at 1325.
39 See Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998). The
Second Circuit reasoned that:
[B]ack rent is much like the obligation arising out of a dishonored check
where a service has been rendered or goods sold on the premise of
immediate payment. The obligation to pay the bounced check, like the duty
to pay back rent, does not derive from an extension of credit ....
45720001
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Considering the plain meaning of the FDCPA, courts should
find the definition of "debt" ambiguous 40 as it applies to back
rent.41 The term "debt" has generally been applied to situations
where credit has been extended.42 When back rent is at issue,
however, it cannot be said that credit has been extended. When
a tenant rents an apartment, no credit is extended to the tenant
because continuous rent payments are to be made at the
beginning of each month for the following month, per the lease
agreement. Nonetheless, a question remains whether the
FDCPA applies to back rent, and therefore, the statute is
ambiguous.
40 A rule of statutory construction is that a court should look to the legislative
intent at the time of enactment. To effectuate this rule, a court should look at the
plain meaning of the statute to be interpreted, foregoing a detailed analysis of the
legislative history only if the meaning of the text is clear. See United States v.
Nordic Village Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (stating that "a statute must, if possible,
be construed in such fashion that every word has some operative effect"); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)
(recognizing that an examination of the plain meaning of a statute must be the
starting point in the construction of a statute); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61
(1949) (reiterating the general rule that it is inappropriate to look to the legislative
history if a statute is unambiguous on its face); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S.
112, 115-16 (1879) (stating that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is that
effect be given to every word, and that every part of a statute must be construed in
light of the whole); In re Witkowski, 16 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that a
court must enforce a statute according to its plain language); see also Solich v.
George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Ctr., 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (Ill. 1994)
(noting that "the cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other canons
and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and
meaning of the legislature"). The United States Supreme Court has recently
indicated that a split in the circuits is evidence that a particular statutory phrase
does not have a plain meaning. See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,
526 U.S. 344, 355 (1999).
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (1994).
42 The term "debt" should be construed in connection with the whole statute.
See Hoffman, 101 U.S. at 115-16 (stating that every part of a statute must be
construed in light of the whole). Notably, the FDCPA defines a "creditor" as "any
person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed." 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(4) (1994) (emphasis added). Moreover, the ordinary definition of the
word "debt" implies that a debtor and creditor have previously entered into an
agreement whereby the debtor has agreed to pay the creditor a specified sum of
money. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "debt" as "[a] sum
of money due by certain and express agreement") (emphasis added). The FDCPA's
definition of the term "debt" follows the ordinary definition by stating that "'debt'
means any obligation... to pay money arising out of a transaction .... " 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(5). Accordingly, "debt" within the FDCPA contemplates that the creditor and
debtor have previously entered into an express agreement that a sum of money is
due to the creditor.
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Considering the ambiguity in the language of the statute,
the court in Romea should have examined the FDCPA's
legislative history in accordance with the general rules of
statutory construction.43 The legislative purpose in enacting the
FDCPA was to protect alleged debtors from the abusive practices
of debt collectors.44 The Second Circuit should have held that
back rent is not a debt and, therefore, collection thereof is not
covered by the FDCPA. Accordingly, back rent should not be
considered a "debt" because there is no extension of credit.
Therefore, the court in Romea should not have applied the
FDCPA.
Had the Romea court looked into the purpose of the FDCPA,
it would have found that the statute was intended to protect
debtors from harassment in connection with the collection of
debts. Though the RPAPL eliminates the potential harassment
of a non-paying tenant by dissuading a landlord from resorting
to "self help," it was primarily enacted to provide an expeditious
procedure for a landlord to regain possession of his or her
premises. 45 The FDCPA applies to the collection of debts, while
the RPAPL is a vehicle used to dispossess a non-paying tenant.
Hence, each statute was enacted for distinctively separate
purposes, and therefore, the FDCPA should not be applied in the
context of the landlord-tenant relationship, which is covered by
the RPAPL.
II. PREEMPTION
In general, before a court may conclude that a federal
statute preempts its state counterpart, the court must find that
Congress clearly manifested an intent to so preempt in the
43 See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) ("[We look first to the
statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is
unclear."). The purpose of the FDCPA was to curb the abusive and harassing
practices of debt collectors, as well as to provide guidelines for debt collectors to
follow. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). Congress sought to prevent
abusive practices including the use of "obscene or profane language, threats of
violence, telephone calls at unreasonable hours," and an array of other annoying
and threatening behaviors. S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1997
U.S.C.CA.N. 1695, 1696. The RPAPL, however, applies to, and was intended to
assist landlords who are seeking to evict nonpaying tenants in an expedient fashion.
See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
44 See supra note 43.
45 See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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statute.46 There are three circumstances in which a federal
statute preempts state law.47 Congress must explicitly define
the area to be preempted, intend the entire body of existing state
law to be superseded by the federal statute, or there must be a
direct inconsistency between the federal statute and the state
law.48 The FDCPA, however, explicitly permits a state statutory
scheme enacted for the same purpose as the FDCPA to remain in
effect so long as the state law provides consumers with greater
protection than the FDCPA or when the protection provided by
the state law is "substantially similar" to the protection provided
by the FDCPA.49
46 See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (reiterating the
principle that Congress must clearly manifest its intent to preempt state law in an
area "'traditionally occupied by the States'") (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
47 See id. at 78 (noting that "[olur cases have established that state law is pre-
empted under the Supremacy Clause... in three circumstances"). As the English
Court noted, preemption jurisprudence stems from the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme
Law of the Land....").
48 See English, 496 U.S. at 78-79. The Court noted that under the first
circumstance "Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-
empt state law." Id. at 78 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 95-98
(1983)). The Court recognized that preemption is primarily a matter of intent and
that Congress's intent is most clear when it is demonstrated by "explicit statutory
language." Id. at 78-79. Under the second circumstance, the English Court found
that state law is preempted by a federal statute when Congress intends to
exclusively regulate the conduct covered by the state law. See id. at 79. This occurs
when the federal statutory scheme is "'so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,' or where an
Act of Congress 'touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of [the state law].' "Id.
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Finally, under
the third circumstance, the Court noted that state law is preempted when it
"actually conflicts" with a federal statute. Id. A conflict occurs when it is impossible
to comply with both the state law and the federal statute. See id. (citing Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)). Conflict can
also occur when "state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Id. (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). "When a valid federal statute explicitly bars
certain types of state action, there are no difficulties. But problems arise when the
federal legislation does not clearly disclose its intended impact on state laws."
GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 337 (13th ed.
1997).
49 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (1994) ("For purposes of this section, a State law is not
inconsistent with this subchapter if the protection such law affords any consumer is
greater than the protection provided by this subchapter."). The FDCPA further
provides that:
460 [Vol.74:451
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The FDCPA should not be construed to preempt section 711
of the RPAPL because this was not the congressional intent.
Preemption is proper when Congress has explicitly defined the
area of state law to be preempted. 50 Congress, however, did not
explicitly denote its intention to completely preempt state real
property law when it enacted the FDCPA, except to say that the
FDCPA will preempt state law where direct inconsistencies
arise.5' Here, there are only inconsistencies if the FDCPA is
deemed to pertain to the landlord-tenant context. Congress did
not expressly indicate that the FDCPA applies to the landlord-
tenant relationship and thereby explicitly preempt state law in
this area. Federal preemption of section 711 of the RPAPL,
therefore, must rest on other grounds.
Preemption is also permitted if Congress intended to
supersede the entire body of state law when it enacted the
federal statute.52 Congress, however, did not intend to preempt
section 711 of the RPAPL because the purpose of the FDCPA is a
consumer protection law enacted to protect consumers involved
in credit transactions, which do not include back rent. While
some courts have found that the FDCPA covers situations
regardless of whether there was an extension of credit,53 this
argument ignores the overall purpose of the CCPA.54 The
FDCPA is part of the statutory framework established by the
CCPA, which has the stated purpose of assuring "a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to
compare more readily the various credit terms available... and
The [Federal Trade] Commission shall by regulation exempt from the
requirements of this subchapter any class of debt collection practices
within any State if the Commission determines that under the law of that
State that class of debt collection practices is subject to requirements
substantially similar to those imposed by this subchapter, and that there is
adequate provision for enforcement.
15 U.S.C. § 1692o (1994).
50 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (1994). This section states that:
This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person
subject to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the laws
of any State with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent
that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and
then only to the extent of the inconsistency.
Id.
52 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53 See supra Part I.
54 15 U.S.C §§ 1601-1693 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
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to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit
billing and credit card practices."55
The purpose of the CCPA is further illustrated by the
regulation promulgated under the CCPA, which states that "this
regulation applies to each individual or business that offers or
extends credit."56 The regulation also includes four criteria, all
of which must be met for the regulation to apply: "(i) The credit
is offered or extended to consumers; (ii) the offering or extension
of credit is done regularly; (iii) the credit is subject to a finance
charge or is payable by a written agreement in more than 4
installments; and (iv) the credit is primarily for personal, family,
or household purposes."57 If the regulation pertains to the CCPA
in its entirety, the FDCPA should only apply to those
transactions involving an extension of credit, even though that
language was not included in the FDCPA. When Congress
enacted the CCPA, it clearly intended to protect consumers from
unfair credit transactions. Because the main purpose of the
CCPA is to prevent unfair credit transactions, and the FDCPA
falls within the CCPA, the FDCPA should be construed to
pertain only in the context of consumer credit transactions.58
If Congress intended to preempt real property law when it
amended the CCPA and enacted the FDCPA, it should have
indicated that the purpose of the FDCPA included the protection
of tenants. The practical effect of the FDCPA is that debt
collectors are prevented from abusing consumers who purchase
goods and services and owe money to a creditor as a result of
55 Id. § 1601(a) (emphasis added).
56 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(c) (1999).
57 Id. (footnote omitted).
58 See Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1168 (3d Cir. 1987)
(finding that "the type of transaction which may give rise to a 'debt' as defined in
the FDCPA, is the same type of transaction as is dealt with in all other subchapters
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, i.e., one involving the offer or extension of
credit to a consumer"). In Bass v. Stolper, 111 F.3d 1322 (1997), the Seventh Circuit
rejected this argument and pointed to other amendments to the CCPA that are not
limited to credit transactions. See id. at 1328. The court cited the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. §1693 (1994), which covers "any transfer of
funds... which is initiated through an electronic terminal," including "automated
teller machine transactions, direct deposits or withdrawals of funds." Id. § 1693a(6).
The Seventh Circuit, however, ignored the possibility that Congress intended to
expand the purpose and scope of the CCPA when it enacted the EFTA and did so
through explicit statutory language. Congress did not use similar explicit statutory
language when it enacted the FDCPA making the overall purpose of the CCPA more
relevant when attempting to determine the true intentions of Congress.
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these purchases. In contrast, the purpose and effect of the
RPAPL is to provide an expedient method for landlords to regain
possession of their property. Thus, it is evident that these are
quite different goals governed by entirely distinct and separate
areas of law.
An examination of the nature of state real property laws,
including section 711 of the RPAPL, also indicates that Congress
did not intend to preempt this area of law when it enacted the
FDCPA. The United States Supreme Court has determined that
there should be no federal preemption when the issue at hand
will cause an impingement into an area that has "been
traditionally occupied by the States,' [and] congressional intent
to supersede state laws [is not] 'clear and manifest.' 59
Moreover, the Supreme Court has refused to either presume or
infer intent to invalidate state law.6 0 The Court has further
remarked that its "function is to determine whether, under the
circumstances,... [the State's] law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress."61 When these principles are applied to the RPAPL
and the FDCPA, it creates a strong argument against federal
preemption.
States generally have authority over the real property
within their jurisdiction, 2 and there are several arguments
59 English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
60 See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (concluding that
"mere conflict" will not cause a federal statute to preempt state law, rather the
federal interest in enacting the statute must suffer "major damage"); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978) (noting the Court's reluctance to
"infer preemption"); New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,
413 (1973) (allowing a New York statute which had an additional requirement over
the federal statute to stand because the Court presumed that state regulations are
legitimate; the Court noted, however, that there was no express language in the
federal statute that demanded federal preemption); see also JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1, at 319 (5th ed. 1995).
61 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also English, 496 U.S. at 79.
62 It is a well-accepted notion that real property rights should generally be
governed by the state law of the situs of the property, particularly when application
of the state law will implement an interest of the situs state. See Oregon v. Corvallis
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378-79 (1977). In Corvallis Sand & Gravel the
Court stated that:
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against the federal government's impingement upon those
rights. State legislatures and courts interact with their citizens
on a daily basis, and therefore, have a greater knowledge of and
familiarity with their needs. This can serve as the basis for
enacting laws that best address the needs of both the
government and the people. In the landlord-tenant context, the
New York Legislature has weighed the need to protect the non-
paying tenant from premature eviction with the interests of the
landlord to regain possession of his or her premises in a timely
manner.63 A state statutory scheme that regulates a purely local
interest should be given deference. Notably, the landlord-tenant
context is significantly different from the credit context. Rent is
charged within the particular state, while credit transactions
can, and often do, transcend state boundaries, thereby lending
support to the federal legislation of credit transactions. The
FDCPA will drastically impinge upon the states' rights to make
Under our federal system, property ownership is not governed by a general
federal law, but rather by the laws of the several States. "The great body of
law in this country which controls acquisition, transmission, and transfer
of property, and defines the rights of its owners in relation to the state or
to private parties, is found in the statutes and decisions of the state."
Id. at 378 (quoting Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944)); see
also Thomson v. Kyle, 23 So. 12, 16 (Fla. 1897) (stating that "we must look to the
laws of the state where [immovable property] is situated for the rules which govern
its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the construction, validity, and effect of
conveyances thereof'); Denison v. Denison, 658 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that the law of the situs state will apply when a real property issue is
to be determined).
The notion that the situs of the property governs which law is to be applied has
substantial support. States have strong interests in governing the title, ownership,
possession, use, and development of property, as well as the resolution of disputes
related to the possession of the property and the enforcement of legal decisions
pertaining thereto. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19.1,
at 744 (2d ed. 1992). Also, "the situs state has a clear interest in land as a source of
public revenue, since real property taxation is premised on the accurate
identification and description of ownership interests in land." Michael S. Finch,
Choice-of-Law and Property, 26 STETSON L. REV. 257, 259 (1996); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222 (1971). See generally Robby
Alden, Note, Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts, 65 TEX. L. REV.
585 (1987) (positing that the law of the state should apply to real property issues
when such laws will further a state interest).
63 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 2000).
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
and enforce landlord-tenant laws if it supersedes the states'
existing statutory scheme in landlord-tenant disputes.64
Congress did not even intend the area of consumer
protection to be ruled "exclusively" by the federal government, as
it granted the states an avenue to petition the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) for an exemption from the FDCPA.65 The fact
that the states were provided with this mechanism indicates
that Congress intended to preserve state statutory schemes
when they were substantially similar to that of the FDCPA.
While this control is not absolute, the FTC does grant states the
right to differentiate their statutes to a certain extent.66
Therefore, Congress has not explicitly preempted state real
property law and has not demonstrated any intent to supersede
the entire area of state real property law, including section 711
of the RPAPL, by enacting the FDCPA. The only remaining
basis for finding federal preemption is a direct conflict between
the RPAPL and the FDCPA. An examination of the provisions of
64 If the FDCPA invades the states' rights to make and enforce laws governing
their real property, the states' interests will be harmed because those interests vary
with location. For example, a landlord of a high-rise apartment building needs to
have an impersonal and expedient remedy as he or she generally does not know the
tenant, but a landlord who rents only a few units will generally know the tenant
and be able to work out a payment plan. While it is true the FDCPA creates a
beneficial and consistent body of law covering consumer debt collection throughout
the nation, the statute should be interpreted to permit location specific laws
governing the landlord-tenant context. See S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2-3 (1977),
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696-97 (calling for federal regulation of
consumer debt collection). The Senate Report for the FDCPA indicated that "[tihe
primary reason why debt collection abuse is so widespread is the lack of meaningful
legislation on the State level" S. REP. No. 95-382 at 2, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1696.
The Senate report further noted that "federal legislation is necessary, because State
officials are unable to act against unscrupulous debt collectors who harass
consumers from another State." S. REP. No. 95-382 at 3, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1697.
In counter to the concerns voiced in the Senate Report, New York has an
effective remedial scheme to help and protect tenants who may be evicted, namely
section 711 of the RPAPL. Furthermore, the situation at hand is one of intrastate
concern. There would be no problem with out-of-state debt collectors because both
the landlord and tenant are subject to the jurisdiction of New York State courts. The
tenant can effectively sue the landlord in New York, even if the landlord is not
present, through the use of long-arm statutes or in-rem jurisdiction, and the tenant
is subject to in personam jurisdiction due to the plaintiffs residence in New York.
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 301, 302 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 2000).
65 See 16 C.F.R. § 910.2 (1999). "Any State may apply to the Commission
pursuant to the terms of this Rule for a determination that, under the laws of that
State . . . [there are] requirements that are substantially similar to [the
FDCPAI." Id.
66 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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the RPAPL and the FDCPA will demonstrate that the apparent
conflict between these two statutes is insufficient to justify
federal preemption because they both govern entirely different
bodies of law.67
III. RPAPL v. FDCPA: THE RPAPL GOVERNS DISPOSSESSION
PROCEEDINGS WHEREAS THE FDCPA GOVERNS DEBT
COLLECTION
The apparent conflict between the three-day notice period
permitted under section 711(2) of the RPAPL and the 30-day
notice period required under the FDCPA is insufficient to justify
federal preemption because section 711 governs dispossession
proceedings 68 whereas the FDCPA governs debt collection.69
Therefore, the FDCPA should not have been applied as it was in
Romea, because the FDCPA was not intended to cover
proceedings in which eviction is the ultimate goal. The RPAPL,
however, was clearly intended to govern dispossession
proceedings and was enacted to assist landlords when a tenant
either refuses to pay rent or vacate the premises. 70 The RPAPL
provides that a landlord must furnish a tenant with three days'
notice prior to starting summary proceedings to dispossess for
failure to pay rent.71 The New York State Legislature intended
to give a landlord, who has not been paid rent, an expedient
avenue to procure the possession of his premises.72 This is
67 See infra Part III.
68 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 2000).
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (1994).
70 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711(2) (McKinney 1979). The statute
provides landlords with a means to remove a non-paying tenant from his premises.
See id. The landlord must serve the tenant with notice and then procure a court
order to have the tenant removed from the apartment. See id.
71 See id.
72 See Marketplace v. Smith, 694 N.Y.S.2d 893, 896 (Monroe County J. Ct.
1999) (recognizing that the statutory scheme provided under section 711 of the
RPAPL provides landlords "with a simple, expeditious and inexpensive means of
regaining possession of premises"); Mitchell v. City of New York, 584 N.Y.S.2d 277,
277 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1992) (noting that "the purpose of summary
proceedings [under section 711 of the RPAPL] is to provide the landlord with a
simple, expeditious and inexpensive means of regaining possession of his
premises"); New York Univ. v. Farkas, 468 N.Y.S.2d 808 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1983) (stating that "summary proceedings [were] designed to provide the landlord
with a simple, expeditious and inexpensive means of regaining possession of his
premises in cases where the tenant refused upon demand to pay rent, or where he
wrongfully held over without permission after expiration of the term"); Maxwell v.
Simons, 353 N.Y.S.2d 589,591 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1973) (same).
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particularly important in the case of a landlord relying on rent
payments to meet mortgage obligations and facing potential
default because a non-paying tenant maintains possession for an
extended period of time. Thus, the main purpose of section 711
of the RPAPL is not collection of back rent that could be
considered a "debt," but rather dispossession of a delinquent
tenant.73
In Schwartz v. Weiss-Newell,74 the court correctly stated that
section 711 of the RPAPL was enacted "to enforce a forfeiture of
an interest in real property,"75 which is not inconsistent with the
purpose of the FDCPA. In fact, the RPAPL requires that
landlords bring summary proceedings prior to, or in conjunction
with, an attempt to collect back rent.76 This signifies that the
RPAPL is not intended to be an avenue for expedient collection
of debts, but rather primarily an expedient remedy for evicting
tenants.
The purposes behind the notice requirements under section
711(2) of the RPAPL and the FDCPA are also different. The
notice requirement under section 711(2) provides a tenant in
default of rent payments three days' notice before the landlord
can initiate summary proceedings. 77 The notice requirement not
only provides notification of a past due debt, but more
importantly provides notification to the tenant that the rent
must be paid or the landlord will retake possession of the
73 See Brusco v. Braun, 645 N.E.2d 724, 726 (N.Y. 1994) (emphasizing that the
state of New York sought to enact a procedure to recover the possession of property
when it promulgated Article 7); Schwartz v. Weiss-Newell, 386 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193-
94 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1976) (finding that the main purpose of summary
proceedings is to enforce a forfeiture of the tenant's interest in real property, and
not to collect the back rent owed); see also supra note 72. While part of the goal is to
eventually assist the landlord to collect the back rent owed, this is not the primary
purpose of the statute.
74 386 N.Y.S.2d 191 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
75 Id. at 193-94 (quoting Zinsser v. Herrman, 52 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (Sup. Ct.
App. T. 1st Dep't 1898)).
76 See DiBello v. Penflex, Inc., 630 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1995).
Jurisdiction is found in section 711 of the RPAPL and is based upon the primary
purpose of "deciding the demand for recovery of possession." Id. at 849. In DiBello,
the plaintiff did not seek to dispossess the nonpaying tenant-he only sought past
due rent and late charges. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case
because petitioner "did not demand recovery of possession of the property in this
action," and because a summary proceeding is "governed entirely by statute." Id.
Strict compliance therewith is necessary.
77 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711(2) (McKinney 1979).
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premises. 78  The 30-day notice period under the FDCPA,
however, applies to consumer debt collectors, not property
owners attempting to dispossess tenants in default.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois followed similar reasoning in Galuska v. Blumenthal.79
The district court, in disallowing the plaintiffs claim under the
FDCPA, held that "an obligation to surrender adverse possession
of real property to its legal owner" is not identical to an
obligation to pay money.80 The court further held that Congress,
in enacting the FDCPA, did not intend for the statute to apply to
actions in ejectment.8' The Galuska court, quoting the United
States Supreme Court's holding in BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corp., concluded that "'the general welfare of society is involved
78 See id. The statute states that summary proceedings can be maintained
when:
The tenant has defaulted in the payment of rent, pursuant to the
agreement under which the premises are held, and a demand of the rent
has been made, or at least three days' notice in writing requiring, in the
alternative, the payment of the rent, or the possession of the premises ....
Id.
79 No. 92C 3781, 1994 WL 323121, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 1994).
80 Id. at *4. In Galuska, however, no money was alleged to be due nor
attempted to be collected. First Illinois Bank financed the defendant's home and
held a warranty deed thereto, which it would only register and acquire title to if the
mortgage were not paid. See id. at *1. Plaintiff did not pay any portion of the
mortgage and eventually First Illinois filed the deed and sought immediate
possession through an ejectment action against the plaintiffs. See id. at *2. The
district court then determined that "an obligation to surrender adverse possession of
real property to its legal owner" is not identical to an obligation to pay money. See
id. at *4.
Therefore, the district court concluded that the action was not subject to the
FDCPA and the thirty-day notice requirement because the bank was merely seeking
possession and there was no "debt" to be collected. See id. at *4-5. In so concluding,
the district court found that "[n]owhere in the declaration of purpose of the FDCPA,
nor in the definitions of 'debt' and 'debt collection,' nor in the legislative history
materials related to the statute, does Congress express any intent whatsoever to
construe actions for ejectment as 'debt collection.'" Id. at *5 (internal citations
omitted).
The Galuska court, however, seemed to hold as it did because there was no
monetary claim, which accordingly, leaves open the question of how an Illinois court
would rule if there were a combined claim for money and ejectment. The principles
enunciated in Galuska, however, could still apply to summary proceedings under
section 711 of the RPAPL because the statute was enacted primarily to "provide the
landlord with a simple, expeditious and inexpensive means of regaining possession
of his premises." Mitchell v. City of New York, 584 N.Y.S.2d 277, 277 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
Bronx County 1992) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 72-73 and
accompanying text.
81 See Galuska 1994 WL 323121, at *5.
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in the security of the titles to real estate' [and] ... [t]o displace
traditional State regulation in such a manner, the federal
statutory purpose must be clear and manifest."8 2
The obligation of a homeowner to pay a mortgage or face
foreclosure is similar to the obligation of a tenant to pay rent or
face eviction. Both situations involve the conditional use of real
property; the homeowner and the tenant must pay or lose the
ability to use the property. Though section 711(2) of the RPAPL
does provide landlords with a mechanism to file claims for back
rent, its main purpose is to restore complete property ownership
rights, including the portion of those rights granted by the
landlord to the tenant in the lease.83 The divestment portion of
the proceedings should not be impacted by the proscriptions of
the FDCPA. A possible, albeit inefficient, remedy to the
supposed conflict is to bifurcate proceedings under the RPAPL.
A landlord wishing to remove a non-paying tenant could bring
suit expediently under the RPAPL, while the collection of unpaid
rent is simultaneously sought following the rules set forth by the
FDCPA. This solution, however, would be a waste of scarce
judicial time and resources and would be costly to both the
tenant and the landlord. The expense associated with two
separate proceedings, coupled with the time required to bring
two lawsuits, would effectively prevent the landlord from ever
collecting back rent.
In Wilson Han Ass'n v. Arthur,8 4 New York's Appellate Term
held that the three-day notice requirement under section 711(2)
of the RPAPL was not subject to the FDCPA.85 In Wilson, the
plaintiff was evicted from her premises for failure to pay rent;
she then brought an order to show cause claiming that the three-
day notice requirement prescribed by the New York statute
82 Id. (quoting BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994)); see
also supra notes 62-64 (discussing the strong interest that the states have in
governing real property within their jurisdiction).
83 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text; see also N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTS. LAW § 711(2) (McKinney 1979). Section 711(2) of the RPAPL allows a
landlord to start dispossession proceedings and to collect back rent after the tenant
has been served with three days notice in writing or a demand of rent has been
made. See id. There is built-in statutory protection for a tenant because he or she
must be given notice of the debt and an opportunity to remedy the situation prior to
the commencement of proceedings. See id. This provides the same type of protection
as the thirty-day notice period under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (1994).
84 N.Y. L.J., July 6, 1999, at 29, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't).
85 See id.
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violated the FDCPA.86 The Appellate Term concluded that the
FDCPA has application in both federal and state courts and that
Congress "spelled out the substantive rights, duties and
remedies [under the FDCPA]," making recourse to Federal
common law unnecessary.8 7 The court then concluded that
"[hiad Congress intended to alter statutory and contractual
rights concerning property rentals by transforming every...
notice for a default in rent payment into a 30-day notice.., such
an intention should have appeared in the statutory language and
the legislative history, which are silent on this point."88
The Wilson decision likely grants landlords the protection of
New York's statutory scheme for dispossession, so long as the
suits are brought under the RPAPL in state court. The incorrect
interpretation and application of the FDCPA by the circuit
courts, however, will still have an adverse effect on landlords
sued in federal district courts, which are bound by the precedent
set forth in Romea.
A. Dispossession is the Equivalent of Repossession Under the
FDCPA
Another argument against federal preemption of section 711
of the RPAPL is provided by the treatment of repossession of
assets under the FDCPA. An attorney acting on behalf of a
landlord who is attempting to dispossess a tenant and a
repossession agent who is attempting to repossess a car or some
other item should be treated similarly under the federal statute.
The FDCPA, however, only applies to the repossession of
property in limited circumstances. The court in Jordan v. Kent
Recovery Services, Inc.,8 9 held that parties acting to repossess
property are subject only to section 1692f(6) of the FDCPA,90
86 See id.
87 Id. (noting that "New York courts are bound by the interpretations of []
lower... Federal courts of a Federal statute only when it was the intent of
Congress in enacting the statute that the Federal Courts share in the task of
fashioning substantive rights, duties and remedies").
88 Id.
89 731 F. Supp. 652 (D. Del. 1990).
90 See id. at 660 (holding that a repossession agent is not subject to the
prohibitions of the FDCPA, "except for the purposes of§ 1692f(6)r); see also Koresko
v. Chase Manhattan Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Koresko), 91 B.R. 689, 694 n.2 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988) (finding that repossession agencies are not subject to the FDCPA);
Kohler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 447 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1982) (deciding that a car can be repossessed without adherence to the FDCPA).
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which prohibits threats of action that were either not intended to
be carried out or are prohibited by law.91 The Jordan court
conducted a thorough examination of the statute and found that
Congress intended that repossession agents be subject only to
this particular section.92
In Jordan, the plaintiff purchased a used car and financed
the purchase with a loan, posting the car as collateral.93 The
plaintiff did not make the required payments and the defendant
hired a repossession agency to procure the vehicle.94 After
numerous attempts by an agent to repossess the car, Jordan
repaid the loan and subsequently commenced suit against the
defendant for alleged violations of the FDCPA.95 The court held
that the FDCPA could not apply in this situation because the
agent who attempted to repossess the vehicle was not a "debt
collector" within the meaning of the FDCPA.96 Rather, since the
vehicle was the collateral on the loan, the repossession agent
was simply collecting the collateral.97
A procedure to dispossess a tenant from premises that he
wrongly inhabits parallels the situation in which a repossession
agent attempts to repossess a car when agreed payments are not
made. Repossession of an automobile is much like the
foreclosure of a mortgage; both are demands for the return of
property due to the failure to make timely payments. It is
irrelevant who is making the demand. Rather, the issue is that
property, rather than a debt, is being recovered. Because
dispossession or ejectment for failure to pay rent parallels
repossession, and considering the finding in Jordan that
repossession is not covered by the FDCPA, dispossession of a
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) (1994).
92 See Jordan, 731 F. Supp. at 658 (noting that "the possessor of secured
property still has control of the property," which relieves the debtor of the
"'suffering and anguish'" associated with the attempts to collect debts that he does
not have) (quoting Schramm v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.2d 85,
91 (3d Cir. 1982)). The court quoted the FTC's statements interpreting the Act as
follows: "Because the FDCPA's definition of 'debt collection' includes parties whose
principal business is enforcing security interests only for [§ 1692f(6)] purposes, such
parties (if they do not otherwise fall within the definition) are subject only to this
provision and not to the rest of the FDCPA." Id. (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
93 See id. at 654.
9 See id.
95 See id. at 655.
93 See id. at 656-59.
9 See id.
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nonpaying tenant should likewise be free from the proscriptions
of the FDCPA.
An attorney, acting under the ambit of section 711 of the
RPAPL, serving notice that summary proceedings will commence
against a tenant if the apartment is not vacated, acts as a
repossession agent. The attorney is "an enforcer of a security
interest [for a client who has a] 'present right' to a piece of
secured property" and should, therefore, be exempt from the
notice provisions of the FDCPA.98 This argument is strongest
when the attorney is merely attempting to dispossess the tenant,
but if the attorney brings a concurrent action to collect back rent,
it is more likely that he will be considered a "debt collector" and
subject to the provisions of the FDCPA. The purpose of the
FDCPA is not furthered by such an inefficient practice. An
attorney working for a landlord-client should be permitted to
give three days' notice and then commence summary proceedings
against a non-paying tenant to regain possession and collect
back rent, as this is the legal channel to regain possession of real
property in New York. Following a decision in the landlord's
favor at trial, the landlord has the right to have the tenant
removed immediately, which is neither prohibited by the FDCPA
nor the RPAPL.
98 Id. at 658. In Jordan, the court found that an "enforcer of a security interest
falls within the ambit of the FDCPA only for purposes of § 1692f(6)." Id. It further
stated that "[sluch a purposeful inclusion for one section of the FDCPA implies that
the term 'debt collector' does not include an enforcer of a security interest for any
other section of the FDCPA." Id. at 657. The court also found that Congress
intended to prohibit repossession agencies from
[tiaklng or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect
dispossession or disablement ofproperty if-
(a) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as
collateral through an enforceable security interest;
(b) there is no present intention to take possession of the property; or
(c) the property is exempted by law from such dispossession or
disablement.
Id. at 657 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)). According to the court's reasoning, if
Congress wanted to subject collection agencies to the 30-day notice requirement, it
would have included this provision in section 1692f(6). The court stated that
"Congress apparently sought to leave unregulated those who enforce security
interests when a 'present right'.. . exists." Id.
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IV. ATTORNEYS AS "DEBT COLLECTORS"
Attorneys were originally exempted from the statutory
definition of "debt collectors."99 As a result, attorneys began
abusing consumers, much like actual debt collectors, prior to the
passage of the FDCPA.100 Subsequently, Congress removed the
attorney exemption from the definition of a "debt collector."1 1
Now, an attorney acting as a debt collector for a client cannot
hide behind the attorney exemption and abuse consumers. 10 2 In
Wilson Han Ass'n v. Arthur,10 3 the New York Appellate Term
held "it has long been the rule [in New York]... that a rent
demand or notice issued by an agent or attorney on behalf of a
landlord is sufficient [under the RPAPL]," but should not be
subject to the FDCPA.10 4 While this ruling is not binding on
either federal or other state courts, it shows the willingness of
the New York courts to uphold New York's statutory scheme and
find that the FDCPA does not apply. Regardless of jurisdiction,
the provisions of the FDCPA do not govern attorneys who do not
collect debts. 05 While the Act does apply to attorneys who
attempt to collect debts for their clients, it does not apply to
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F) (1982) (repealed 1986).
100 See David Hilton, As If We Had Enough to Worry About... Attorneys and
the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Supreme Court Rules on Former
Attorney Exemption, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 165, 167 (1996) (examining the original
and amended versions of the FDCPA and commenting on the changes).
101 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1994).
102 See Ladick v. Van Gemert, 146 F.3d 1205, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the defendant attorney was subject to the FDCPA when he attempted to collect
a past due condominium assessment); Eina Realty v. Calixte, 679 N.Y.S.2d 796, 798
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1998) (stating the "now well-settled [rule] that an
attorney who, acting on behalf of a creditor, regularly engages in consumer debt
collection activities through litigation is a 'debt collector' under the FDCPA") (citing
Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995)); see also Shapiro & Meinhold v. Zartman,
823 P.2d 120, 124 (Colo. 1992) (holding that an attorney who partakes "'directly or
indirectly'... in debt collection activities on behalf of others" is subject to the
FDCPA).
103 N.Y. L.J., July 6, 1999, at 29, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't).
104 Id. The court noted that previous versions of section 711 of the RPAPL
allowed an agent of the landlord to serve process. The court held that the failure of
the legislature to include such language in the current statute was not intended to
change the rule. See id.
105 See Hilton, supra note 100, at 170.
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landlords who are collecting debts or in-house attorneys who
collect debts on behalf of a corporation that employs them.06
The practical result of the inclusion of attorneys within the
definition of "debt collector" is the recent trend of landlords
collecting debts for themselves and serving their own tenants. 10 7
It has been advised that "[u]ntil the dust settles, in order to
avoid the prospect of delay, dismissal or the imposition of civil
penalties, attorneys may be well-advised to refrain from
executing and sending rent demands to residential tenants."08
If the FDCPA is deemed to apply to an attorney in this situation,
a landlord could circumvent the statute by simply making a
demand for rent without the assistance of an attorney. It is also
conceivable that a landlord could ask an attorney to draft a letter
to a particular tenant on plain paper, instead of the firn's
letterhead, which the landlord could then sign and deliver to the
tenant. Because a landlord, acting on his or her own behalf, does
not qualify as a "debt collector," the FDCPA would not apply. As
a result, the landlord is subject only to the three-day notice
requirement under section 711(2) of the RPAPL prior to
initiating summary proceedings. 109 The practical effect of this
situation, however, is that a lay person, such as a landlord, will
not be bound by, and may even be unaware of, the FDCPA's
proscriptions, and therefore, may be more abusive than a third
party debt collector or attorney when attempting to personally
collect rent. Furthermore, a landlord would have to deliver the
rent demand to the tenant on his or her own volition, then hire a
lawyer for representation in court during the summary
proceedings. This seems to defy reason because it would require
a landlord-client to wait thirty days or more to have a non-
paying tenant dispossessed merely because the landlord sought
106 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1994). The term does not pertain to a person who
is collecting a debt for himself, as evidenced by the requirement that the "debt
collector" must be attempting to collect a debt "owed or due or asserted to be owed
or due another." Id.; see also Calixte, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 798 (adhering to the rule that
individuals acting for themselves are not subject to the FDCPA).
107 See Rent Demands: Recent Cases Clarify Romea's Reach, 1 LANDLORD-
TENANT PRAC. REP. 1, 8 (Issue "S" 1999).
108 Id.; see also Robert E. Parella, Real Property, 1997-98 Survey of New York
Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 703, 713 (1999) (stating that "[iun order to avoid the time
delay [imposed by the FDCPA], landlords will themselves have to sign the [written
rent] demand").
109 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711(2) (McKinney 1979).
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legal assistance from an attorney, rather than taking matters
into his or her own hands.
V. NEW YORK'S STATUTORY SCHEME
The New York State statutory scheme provides sufficient
protection for tenants facing dispossession and rent demands,
especially considering that the FDCPA does not apply to
landlords acting on their own behalf. New York has specific
remedies for a tenant who thinks that rent need not be paid
because of the quality of the premises, namely a breach of the
warranty of habitability,110 or a tenant who wishes to apply the
rent to bills he or she has paid for repairs to the apartment."'
Generally, however, the tenant must pay rent for the time he or
she is in possession, leaving nothing to dispute regarding a claim
of unpaid rent.1 2 The implied warranty of habitability present
in every residential lease in New York grants the tenant the
ability to sue for a rent abatement if the condition of the
premises "deprive[s] the tenant of those essential functions
110 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b(1) (McKinney 1989). This section provides
that:
In every written or oral lease or rental agreement for residential premises
the landlord or lessor shall be deemed to covenant and warrant that the
premises so leased or rented and all areas used in connection therewith in
common with other tenants or residents are fit for human habitation and
for the uses reasonably intended by the parties and that the occupants of
such premises shall not be subjected to any conditions which would be
dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to their life, health or safety. When
any such condition has been caused by the misconduct of the tenant or
lessee or persons under his direction or control, it shall not constitute a
breach of such covenants and warranties.
Id.
111 See id. § 235-b (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2000).
112 The thirty-day notice requirement was included in the FDCPA to provide
consumers an opportunity to dispute the "validity" of the alleged debt. If the
consumer notifies the debt collector that he or she is disputing the validity of the
entire, or even a portion of the debt, the debt collector "shall cease collection of the
debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of
the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor"
and sends it to the consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (1994). Therefore, a tenant need
only show a copy of a receipt for rent paid to the landlord or the judge to be relieved
of liability and to be allowed to remain in the premises.
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which a residence is expected to provide."113 A tenant, however,
is still required to pay the rent and then attempt to get an
abatement.
Under current New York law, a tenant has ample protection
from the abuse of landlords, as he or she cannot be removed from
an apartment without the proper proceedings. 114 As such, the
purpose of the FDCPA would not be furthered by its application
to the landlord-tenant situation in New York. If required to wait
the thirty days, New York landlords will resort to self-help in
evicting tenants, which is a much more problematic and
dangerous situation than allowing landlord-tenant cases to go to
court with three days notice.
To force the FDCPA to apply to dispossession and the
collection of debts, as opposed to the collection of debts
exclusively, would infringe upon the rights of a number of other
states, not just those of New York. States have adopted
statutory schemes which govern the landlord-tenant relationship
and have provided legal channels that allow a landlord to
113 Park W. Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1295 (N.Y. 1979)
(stating that the implied warranty of habitability creates a minimum standard of
occupancy for a dwelling to qualify as fit for safe habitation). For example, suppose
a tenant has a lease on an apartment for two years on the tenth floor, and in the
middle of the first year the elevator breaks and the landlord refuses to repair it. The
tenant can either break the lease and move out of the apartment without liability
and procure the security deposit, or seek a judicially-granted rent abatement to
compensate for the loss of the elevator. In either instance, the tenant is protected
from abuses by the landlord. When a tenant proves that a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability occurred, he or she is entitled to a rent abatement in the
amount of the "difference between the fair market value of the premises if they had
been as warranted, as measured by the rent reserved under the lease, and the value
of the premises during the period of the breach." Id. at 1295.
114 New York statutory law granting tenant proceedings reflects the
constitutional Due Process protections given tenants under the United States and
New York State Constitutions. See Lang v. Pataki, 674 N.Y.S.2d 903, 909 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1998) (holding that leasehold interests are an aspect of real property
law protected by the federal and state Due Process clauses).
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dispossess a tenant in default. 115 The Second Circuit's holding in
Romea will essentially eradicate these state statutory schemes.
VI. THE NEED FOR AN FTC EXEMPTION
New York's statutory scheme creates an equal balance
between landlord interests and tenant protections. New York
can and should petition the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
rule that section 711 of the RPAPL is exempt from the
FDCPA.116 The FDCPA expressly provides in section 1692o for a
means to have a particular state's laws trump the FDCPA.117
When a state applies for an exemption from the FDCPA
pursuant to section 1692o, it must have its own laws in place to
11 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.690 (Michie 1998) (stating that "a landlord
has a right to re-enter leased premises when a tenant fails to pay rent, and may
bring action to recover the possession of the premises"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.56
(West 1987 & Supp. 1999) (indicating that Florida requires that the landlord give
the tenant seven days to leave the premises, after which time the landlord can
terminate the rental agreement if the tenant fails to comply); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 6002(1) (West Supp. 1999). Maine was granted an exemption by the FTC
from the FDCPA for some of its statutes, including a provision that states that if a
tenant is "7 days or more in arrears in the payment of rent," the landlord or his
agent can terminate the tenancy with seven days notice. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 6002(1). This is clearly less time then that mandated by the FDCPA, yet the
FTC found that Maine's statutes were in substantial compliance with the FDCPA.
116 Maine recently sought an exemption from the FDCPA for certain types of
debt collection activities including- "Collection by means of the mails and other
interstate and intrastate written communications; collection by use of telephone and
other electronic means of transmission; in-person collection; and repossession or
other 'enforement of security interest' activity." FTC Notice of Me. Exemption from
the FDCPA, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,972, 66,973 (1995). The Federal Trade Commission
attempted to determine "whether the level of protection to consumers under the
Maine Act is substantially equivalent" to the FDCPA. Id. New York's laws are
similar to both Maine's and the FDCPA, except that a shorter notice period is
required under section 711(2) of the RPAPL. While this seems substantial, the
particular situation necessitates a short period of notice. See supra notes 70-73 and
accompanying text.
137 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692o (1994). This section states that:
The Commission shall by regulation exempt from the requirements of this
subchapter any class of debt collection practices within any State if the
Commission determines that under the law of that State that class of debt
collection practices is subject to requirements substantially similar to
those imposed by this subchapter, and that there is adequate provision for
enforcement.
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fulfill the intended purpose of the FDCPA. 118 The state's laws
must be "substantially similar" to those imposed under the
FDCPA119 to ensure that consumers will not be afforded less
protection under the particular state law. 120 If the FTC finds,
after a thorough analysis, that under state law "a class of debt
collection practices is subject to requirements substantially
similar to, or that provide greater protection to consumers than,
those imposed under"121 the FDCPA and that the state has made
adequate provisions for enforcement of its policies, the particular
practice in that state will be exempted from the rules of the
FDCPA.122
To prevent similar problems and to further the policies
behind its real property laws, New York should petition the FTC
for an exemption because New York's statutory scheme is
substantially similar to the FDCPA. On December 27, 1995,
Maine was granted an exemption from the FDCPA. 123 The FTC
found that Maine's laws were "substantially similar" to the
FDCPA, even though the FTC noted that only in some instances
did Maine's laws provide greater protection for the consumer
than the FDCPA.124 Thus, the FDCPA does not require that
every aspect of a state's statutory scheme provide greater
protection for the consumer than the federal statute to allow
exemption status.
118 See id.; see also 16 C.F.R. § 901.1 (1999) ('This part establishes procedures
and criteria whereby States may apply to the Federal Trade Commission for
exemption of a class of debt collection practices within the applying State from the
provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ...
119 See 16 C.F.R. § 901.4 (1999).
120 See id. (delineating the criteria which must be present before an exemption
is granted).
121 16 C.F.R. § 901.6 (1999).
- See 16 C.F.R. § 901.6-.8 (1999). The exemption is not permanent. It can be
revoked if the Commission determines that the particular state law "does not, in
fact, impose requirements that are substantially similar to, or that provide greater
protection to applicants" than the FDCPA. Id. § 901.8(a). The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals implied that New York State should petition the FTC for exemption
status when it stated that "New York may petition the Federal Trade Commission
to promulgate regulations that exempt § 711 notices from the FDCPA." Romea v.
Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 118 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998). New York has not yet
petitioned the FTC for such an exemption. See id.
123 See FTC Notice of Me. Exemption from the FDCPA, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,972
(1995).
124 See FTC Notice of Me. Exemption from the FDCPA, 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,972-
73.
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In analyzing the protections afforded the "consumer" under
the FDCPA and those afforded the tenant under New York's
statutory scheme, substantial similarities are revealed. A full
exemption from the provisions of the FDCPA is neither
warranted nor feasible; New York's landlord-tenant laws,
however, should govern the landlord-tenant situations in New
York. Both federal and state statutes contain a notice
requirement. New York has numerous statutes that prevent
landlords from arbitrarily depriving a tenant of the necessities of
life, including heat, hot water, and a leak-free roof.125 These
protections serve to prevent a landlord from self-help in
dispossessing a tenant. Also, New York furthers the goals of the
FDCPA through its own statutory framework. 126 Therefore, a
125 New York's current Multiple Dwelling Law provides such protections to
inhabitants of multiple dwellings. See N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW, §§ 75-84
(McKinney 1974 & Supp. 2000). The law requires owners to maintain premises in
general good repair, see id. at § 78(1), provide for adequate plumbing, drainage,
sewage, and roofing, see id. at § 77, mandatory heating, see id. at § 79, hot water, see
d. at § 75(3), and provide protections from dangerous lighting and ventilation, see
id. at § 78(2); see also N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2000).
Generally, a party seeking to suspend rent payments must vacate the premises in
order to allege a constructive eviction. See Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real
Estate Corp., 256 N.E.2d 707, 710 (N.Y. 1970). But see Johnson v. Cabrera, 668
N.Y.S.2d 45, 46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1998) (holding that the deprivation of heat
and hot water constitutes a constructive eviction, and even though the tenant is still
in possession of the apartment, rent may be suspended).
12 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 601 (McKinney 1996). This statute provides in
pertinent part:
No principal creditor, as defined by this article, or his agent shall:
1. Simulate in any manner a law enforcement officer, or a representative
of any governmental agency of the state of New York or any of its political
subdivisions; or
2. Knowingly collect, attempt to collect, or assert a right to any collection
fee, attorney's fee, court cost or expense unless such changes [sic] are justly
due and legally chargeable against the debtor; or
3. Disclose or threaten to disclose information affecting the debtor's
reputation for credit worthiness with knowledge or reason to know that the
information is false; or
4. Communicate or threaten to communicate the nature of the consumer
claim to the debtor's employer prior to obtaining a final judgment against
the debtor. The provisions of this subdivision shall not prohibit a principal
creditor from communicating with the debtor's employer to execute a wage
assignment agreement if the debtor has consented to such an agreement;
or
5. Disclose or threaten to disclose information concerning the existence of
a debt known to be disputed by the debtor without disclosing that fact; or
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tenant need not be afforded the thirty-day notice period within
which to prepare for litigation or dispute the alleged debt when
the tenant is already protected by statute for the statutorily
defined justified non-payment of rent.
The protections New York law offers consumers are
substantially similar to those provided by the FDCPA. The
FDCPA, by regulating the time and/or place of communications
as well as the persons that may be contacted, prohibits a debt
collector from abusing a debtor.127 Nor can a debt collector
"engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to
harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the
collection of a debt."128 New York's statutory scheme pertaining
to debt collection procedures prohibits a creditor from collecting
a false debt, damaging the debtor's reputation, telling the
debtor's employer of the debt, calling or communicating with the
debtor at unusual hours, or threatening an unintended action.1'
New York also provides penalties for violations of the New York
General Business Law sections 600-603, which are required by
the FTC for it to grant an exemption. 130 Although there is no
private cause of action permitted under New York's statute, the
attorney general or district attorney "may bring an action in the
6. Communicate with the debtor or any member of his family or household
with such frequency or at such unusual hours or in such a manner as can
reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor; or
7. Threaten any action which the principal creditor in the usual course of
his business does not in fact take; or
8. Claim, or attempt or threaten to enforce a right with knowledge or
reason to know that the right does not exist; or
9. Use a communication which simulates in any manner legal or judicial
process or which gives the appearance of being authorized, issued or
approved by a government, governmental agency, or attorney at law when
it is not.
Id. (footnote omitted).
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (1994). According to the statute "a debt collector may
not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt...
at any unusual time or place," such as after eight o'clock p.m. and before nine o'clock
a.m. Id. § 1692c(a)(1). The debt collector must correspond with the consumer's
attorney and cannot contact the consumer at his place of employment. See id.
§ 1692c(a)(2)-(3). The debt collector cannot provide information to any third party
regarding the debt, except the consumer's attorney. See id. § 1692c(b).
128 Id. § 1692(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
129 See supra note 126.
130 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 602(1) (McKinney 1996) ("Except as otherwise
provided by law, any person who shall violate the terms of this article shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and each such violation shall be deemed a separate offense.").
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name of the people of the state to restrain or prevent any
violation."13 1 The existence of New York's scheme will provide a
basis for the FTC exemption.
New York's debt collection statute and the FDCPA are
virtually identical in their protections, except for the longer
notice period that is required under the FDCPA. The protections
afforded to consumers by the FDCPA would not be greatly
diminished if New York were granted an exemption and was
therefore able to apply its laws. The New York exemption need
only pertain to landlord-tenant situations, where greater
protections would be afforded the consumer than if only the
FDCPA applied. In New York, tenants have the ability to bring
suit if there is a problem with the premises. In addition, tenants
are protected by section 601 of the New York General Business
Law from unfair debt collection practices and are afforded notice
prior to summary proceedings to evict. Applying New York's
statutory scheme will better satisfy the interests of all parties
involved, as landlords are provided with an expedient remedy to
remove a delinquent tenant and tenants receive notice and are
not subject to abuse by landlords.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit erred in its holding in Romea by
following the Seventh Circuit in paralleling back rent to a
dishonored check and including back rent as a "debt" within the
meaning of the FDCPA. While it is true that a dishonored check
is a debt, the relationship between a landlord and a tenant is
different. A payee who accepts a check extends credit to the
consumer in his trust that the check will be honored. When a
landlord rents an apartment to a tenant, however, no credit is
extended to the tenant because continuous rent payments are to
be made per the contractual lease agreement. The term "debt"
as used throughout the rest of the CCPA pertains to the
extension of credit. As such, the Second Circuit should have
found that the back rent owed by Romea was not a "debt" within
the meaning of the FDCPA.
131 Id. § 602(2); see also Varela v. Investors Ins. Holding Corp., 615 N.E.2d 218,
219 (N.Y. 1993) (denying a private cause of action under section 601 of New York's
General Business Law). A private cause of action, however, is permitted when a
person incurs actual damages caused by deceptive business practices. See N.Y. GEN.
BUS. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 1988).
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The FDCPA should also not be applied to the landlord-
tenant area because Congress has not made its intent to preempt
state law in this area sufficiently clear. The FDCPA is meant to
protect against abusive debt collectors, while section 711 of the
RPAPL creates an equal balance between the rights of a landlord
to hire an attorney to dispossess a non-paying tenant, and the
rights of the tenant to receive notice prior to the commencement
of summary proceedings and be free from unsubstantiated and
unlawful eviction.
While the Second Circuit stated that New York had the
ability to petition the FTC for an exemption from the
requirements of the FDCPA, it did not fully discuss the
ramifications of such an exemption. The rights of New York
citizens can best be fulfilled through an FTC granted exemption,
which would allow the New York Legislature to govern its own
citizens. The application of the FDCPA and the RPAPL in their
respective contexts will guarantee the promotion of fair debt
collection and protection from deceptive and abusive practices.
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